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Second wave positive psychology:  
Exploring the positive-negative dialectics of wellbeing  
 
Abstract 
Positive psychology has tended to be defined in terms of a concern with ‘positive’ psychological 
qualities and states. However, critics of the field have highlighted various problems inherent in 
classifying phenomena as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative.’ For instance, ostensibly positive 
qualities (e.g., optimism) can sometimes be detrimental to wellbeing, whereas apparently 
negative processes (like anxiety) may at times be conducive to it. As such, over recent years, a 
more nuanced ‘second wave’ of positive psychology has been germinating, which explores the 
philosophical and conceptual complexities of the very idea of the ‘positive.’ The current paper 
introduces this emergent second wave by examining the ways in which the field is developing a 
more subtle understanding of the ‘dialectical’ nature of flourishing (i.e., involving a complex and 
dynamic interplay of positive and negative experiences). The paper does so by problematizing 
the notions of positive and negative through seven case studies, including five salient 
dichotomies (such as optimism versus pessimism) and two complex processes (posttraumatic 
growth and love). These case studies serve to highlight the type of critical, dialectical thinking 
that characterises this second wave, thereby outlining the contours of the evolving field. 
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Introduction 
Positive psychology (PP) is at an interesting point in its development. The initial impetus for the 
creation of the field was a sense of disenchantment with the way ‘psychology as usual’ appeared 
to be preoccupied with disorder and dysfunction. Given this, the promise of this innovative new 
branch of psychology was a forum where scholars could explore the ‘brighter sides of human 
nature’ (Linley & Joseph, 2004, p.4). However, in these formative years, PP often appeared to 
embrace a polarising rhetoric, in which ostensibly ‘negative’ phenomena were conceptualised as 
undesirable (and thus to be avoided), whereas apparently ‘positive’ qualities were seen as 
necessarily beneficial (and thus to be sought). We might refer to this initial embrace of the 
positive as the ‘first wave’ of PP.  But, as the field grew to prominence, this kind of polarisation 
came under fire from critics both inside the field (e.g., Wong, 2011) and outside (e.g., Held, 
2004). On the one hand, such critics argued that qualities that were commonly presented as 
positive could, under certain circumstances, be counterproductive. For example, ‘unrealistic’ 
optimism was linked to under-appreciation of risk and thus to subsequent health risk 
behaviours, such as smoking (Weinstein, Marcus, & Moser, 2005). (One must add that this point 
was not lost on PP scholars themselves; as Seligman (1990, p.292) pointed out, one must be 
‘able to use pessimism’s keen sense of reality when we need it.’) On the other hand, ostensibly 
negative states could paradoxically be conducive to flourishing. For instance, theorists such as 
Tavris (1989) have argued that anger could motivate someone to act against and change an 
invidious situation that had been hindering their wellbeing. Through arguments such as these, 
the initial premise of PP – defined as it was by a focus on the positive – appeared to be 
somewhat challenged and even undermined.  
However, rather than serving to destabilise the field, these types of critical arguments 
have helped PP to reach a new phase of maturity and development, one we might refer to as 
‘second wave’ PP (Held, 2004) or ‘positive psychology 2.0’ (Wong, 2011). This second wave 
approach – hereafter referred to as SWPP – is still driven by concern with the same meta-
concepts that underpinned the first wave of PP, such as flourishing and wellbeing. (Following 
Delle Fave, Brdar, Freire, Vella-Brodrick, and Wissing (2011), this paper will generally use the 
term ‘wellbeing’ as an overarching construct to encompass the range of positive qualities and 
outcomes of interest to PP, such as resilience and happiness.) However, SWPP is characterised 
by an altogether more nuanced approach to the concepts of positive and negative, and by a 
subtle appreciation of the ambivalent nature of the good life. More specifically, it will be argued 
here that SWPP is above all epitomised by an appreciation of the fundamentally dialectical 
nature of wellbeing. The current paper, then, offers a review of this second wave development 
of the field by exploring the critical arguments – made by scholars both inside and outside the 
field (the latter of whom may well not identify as being ‘part of’ PP) – that prompted and 
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underpinned the emergence of this second wave approach. The paper does this by considering a 
number of key constructs that have been central to PP, and exploring the difficulties inherent in 
trying to classify such phenomena as either positive or negative. Of course, the constructs 
featured here do not exhaust the possibilities for this type of analysis, but rather serve as ‘case 
studies’ or exemplars for the kind of critical thinking that characterises SWPP. However, before 
we engage with these seven case studies, we must first introduce the idea of dialectics, as this is 
arguably the defining feature of SWPP. 
The dialectics of wellbeing 
This paper contends that SWPP is above all characterised by an appreciation of the dialectical 
nature of wellbeing. By saying this, we are also acknowledging that SWPP is not only based upon 
this; for instance, as set out below, this appreciation of dialectics has partly been fostered by a 
greater understanding of the contextual social and cultural factors that influence wellbeing, as 
explored by scholars such as Wong and Wong (2012) and McNulty and Fincham (2011). 
Nevertheless, the current paper focuses specifically on this dialectical appreciation, as this is the 
clearest factor we can identify at present separating first wave and second wave approaches. 
Essentially, dialectics refers to the dynamic ‘tension of opposition between two interacting 
forces or elements’ (Merriam-Webster, 2014). This tension describes the way in which binary 
opposites – such as positive and negative, or light and dark – while being diametrically opposed, 
are yet intimately connected and dependent upon the other for their very existence. Moreover, 
the term dialectic does not simply refer to a static relationship between opposites, but to the 
way in which many phenomena change and evolve through the dynamic interplay between 
these opposites. One particularly formative conception of such dialectic change was formulated 
by the German philosopher Hegel (1812), who argued that development occurs through a 
process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. An example might be the development of ideas. An 
argument is advanced, say, that people are fundamentally good; this proposition is the thesis. 
People might subsequently discern flaws in this perspective, and respond with the counter-
argument that people are inherently errant; this retort would be the antithesis. However, this 
counter-argument may then itself be found to be wanting. Crucially though, this does not 
necessitate reverting to the original thesis. Rather, what may emerge is a subtle synthesis 
incorporating aspects of both arguments (e.g., acknowledging that people have the potential for 
good and bad), creating a higher unity that transcends and yet preserves the truth of both 
original opposites (Mills, 2000).  
 The notion of dialectics is central to SWPP, as wellbeing is seen as a dialectical process, 
both in the general sense of involving a complex interplay of conceptual opposites, and possibly 
also in the Hegelian sense of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. The dialectical nature of wellbeing is 
revealed by three distinct ‘principles.’ First, there is what we might call the ‘principle of 
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appraisal’: it can be difficult to categorise particular phenomena (e.g., emotions) as positive or 
negative, as such appraisals are fundamentally contextually-dependent (McNulty & Fincham, 
2011). To illustrate this point, the first five sections below focus on five key dichotomies: 
optimism vs. pessimism, self-esteem vs. humility, freedom vs. restriction, forgiveness vs. anger, 
and happiness vs. sadness. For each of these dichotomies, the paper seeks to problematize the 
very notions of positive and negative by suggesting that ‘positive can be negative’ (phenomena 
commonly regarded as positive, such as optimism, may be detrimental to wellbeing under 
certain circumstances), and ‘negative can be positive’ (there can be value in qualities and states 
frequently conceptualised as negative, such as pessimism). Second, there is what we might call 
the ‘principle of co-valence’: not only is it difficult to characterise particular phenomena as 
either positive or negative, many emotional states are ‘co-valenced,’ inherently involving 
complex, intertwined shades of light and dark (Lazarus, 2003). For example, hope constitutes a 
fragile mix of yearning for a desired outcome, a degree of confidence that this has some chance 
of occurring, and an anxiety that it will not. This issue will be addressed in the final two sections, 
which look at two complex processes which can be regarded as co-valenced: posttraumatic 
growth and love. Third, and most fundamentally, there is what we could call the ‘principle of 
complementarity’: wellbeing itself can be seen as involving an ‘inevitable dialectics between 
positive and negative aspects of living’ (Ryff & Singer, 2003, p.272). This insight builds upon 
recent theorising by Keyes (2007), whose dual-continua model proposes that wellbeing and ill-
being are not two poles of a continuum, but are two separate dimensions of functioning. This 
model has been corroborated by work which has shown that wellbeing is not simply an absence 
of ill-being, and distress is not necessarily incompatible with subjective wellbeing (Fianco et al., 
2015). However, the principle of complementarity goes further in suggesting that not only can 
distress and wellbeing be co-present, but they are to an extent co-dependent. Indeed, Delle Fave 
et al.’s (2011) Eudaimonic and Hedonic Happiness Investigation project has found that the most 
important self-rated psychological component of happiness is ‘harmony,’ which can mean 
‘balancing opposite elements into a whole’ (p.199). Thus, the principle of complementarity – 
which this paper as a whole seeks to elucidate – holds that wellbeing fundamentally involves a 
‘dynamic harmonization’ of dichotomous states. 
In acknowledging that wellbeing may involve seemingly ‘negative’ components, it could 
be argued that this undermines the very premise of PP, since its formative ethos was to redress 
the ‘negativity’ of ‘psychology as usual’ by focusing on more positive aspects of life. However, we 
would argue that, far from undermining PP, this emerging critical awareness means that PP is 
moving into a new phase of development, one which we are calling the field’s ‘second wave.’ 
Indeed, we can use the notion of dialectics to appreciate not only the complex nature of 
wellbeing, but the evolution of PP itself. One might view ‘psychology as usual,’ with its apparent 
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focus on the negative, as the thesis. In critiquing this and embracing the positive, first wave PP 
thus presented itself as the antithesis. However, as elucidated below, critics have begun to 
identify flaws in this antithesis, highlighting the pitfalls of apparently positive qualities and the 
potential merits of negative ones. Crucially though, from a Hegelian perspective, this does not 
mean we must abandon PP and revert back to the thesis, back to psychology as usual. Rather, in 
this dialectical process, the next stage is (ideally) synthesis, in which the truths of both thesis 
and antithesis are preserved, while the flaws in their respective positions are overcome. And, 
one might argue, SWPP represents just such a synthesis. In this, there is a movement away from 
a simplistic binary view that un-reservedly classifies phenomena as either positive and negative, 
valorising the former while condemning the latter, towards a more nuanced appreciation of the 
dialectical complexities of flourishing. Paul Wong (2012) – the foremost dialectical theoretician 
in PP, who spearheaded this second wave – refers to this more nuanced perspective as the ‘dual-
systems model’; this represents a synthesis of first wave PP (with its emphasis on positivity) 
and existential psychology (which focuses on engagement with the dark side of the human 
condition). In sum, SWPP recognises the validity of King’s (2001, pp.53-54) contention that 
flourishing does not mean being a ‘well-defended fortress, invulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
life,’ but appreciating and even embracing the complex and ambivalent nature of life.  
Before examining the seven case studies, it is worth stating that in exploring SWPP, we 
may find ourselves challenging constructions of wellbeing that tend to be dominant in the West. 
Critical theorists argue that the kind of ‘first wave’ thinking introduced above – the valorisation 
of ostensibly positive emotions – is reflective of broader historical currents of thought that have 
held sway in the West over recent centuries (Becker & Marecek, 2008). Consequently, one of the 
driving forces behind the emergence of SWPP has been critical awareness of cross-cultural 
variation in constructions and perceptions of wellbeing, as per the ‘Cultural Lens Approach’ 
(Hardin, Robitschek, Flores, Navarro, & Ashton, 2014). This awareness has engendered an 
appreciation of dialectics in two key ways. Firstly, cross-cultural analyses have highlighted the 
‘principle of appraisal’ by showing cultural variation in whether phenomena are valorized as 
positive or negative. For example, it is suggested that Western and Eastern cultures construct 
wellbeing in markedly different ways (Joshanloo, 2014); e.g., Western cultures tend to value 
high arousal positive states (such as excitement), whereas Eastern cultures valorise low arousal 
ones (such as calmness) (Tsai, 2007). Likewise, in the context of critiquing the United Nations 
Development Program, Schimmel (2013) argues that Western markers of societal progress, like 
material abundance, are not equally valued across cultures. Secondly, our appreciation of the 
dialectical nature of flourishing has been enhanced through studying other cultures that 
themselves tend to endorse just such a dialectical perspective, particularly Eastern cultures 
(Uchida & Ogihara, 2012). This cross-cultural appreciation has helped the field challenge the 
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Western-influenced conceptions of happiness that underpinned the first wave of PP. That said, 
we can also recognise that many thinkers in the West, past and present – from Hegel (1812) to 
Lazarus (2003) – have likewise developed dialectical perspectives, and who we can also draw 
on in developing SWPP. So, with that in mind, we now explore the dialectical nature of SWPP by 
examining five key dichotomies (beginning with optimism and pessimism), before looking at 
two co-valenced processes, namely posttraumatic growth and love. 
Optimism and pessimism 
The first dichotomy considered here is optimism versus pessimism. The first wave of PP was 
characterised by a tendency to valorise optimism as integral to wellbeing and to conversely 
denigrate pessimism as antithetic to flourishing. However, there are pitfalls that can occur 
should optimism be excessive or unrealistic. Indeed, such risks were to some extent recognised 
from the outset in PP (showing that the seeds of SWPP were already present in the first years of 
the movement); as Seligman (1990, p.292) put it, we must be wary of being  a ‘slave to the 
tyrannies of optimism,’ but must be ‘able to use pessimism’s keen sense of reality when we need 
it.’ Empirical work corroborates this insight, revealing diverse problems associated with undue 
optimism, most relating to an under-appreciation of risk, leading to risk-taking behaviour  (e.g., 
smoking; Weinstein et al., 2005). Optimism has thus even been implicated as a mortality-risk: 
Friedman et al.’s (1993) longitudinal research suggested that ‘cheerful’ children (optimism plus 
humour) lived shorter lives than more conscientious peers. That said, other studies have found 
that optimism predicts longevity (Giltay, Geleijnse, Zitman, Hoekstra, & Schouten, 2004). Thus, 
as with all qualities considered here, context is key. For instance, Peterson (2000, p.51) argued 
that ‘people should be optimistic when the future can be changed by positive thinking but not 
otherwise.’ This last point captures a fundamental principle of second wave thinking: a deep 
appreciation of situational context (McNulty & Fincham, 2011). This does not mean that one can 
never make value judgements about good and bad (SWPP does not necessitate a descent into 
the murky waters of relativism), but just cautions against a priori categorisation of phenomena; 
all such judgements are (i.e., should be) contextual. On that note though, we can also 
acknowledge contexts where Peterson’s point does not hold. For instance, Wong (2009) 
highlights Viktor Frankl’s (1963) notion of ‘tragic optimism,’ which recognises the importance 
of sometimes keeping alive a flame of hope no matter how bleak the current outlook or future 
possibilities. Indeed, for existentialists such as Camus (1955), this arguably sums up the nature 
of the human condition, bounded as it is by the bleak finality of mortality. 
Naturally, in considering the pitfalls of optimism (positive can be negative), we can 
invert this questioning and consider the value of its counterpart, pessimism (negative can be 
positive). For instance, Norem (2001) highlights the ‘positive power of negative thinking,’ e.g., 
the connection between pessimism and proactive coping. Here we might usefully differentiate 
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between ‘pure’ pessimism (a fatalistic assumption of the worst) and strategic pessimism 
(anticipatory fault-finding and problem solving). One might struggle to find merit in the former; 
although, that said, Schopenhauer (1819) argued that one could find a form of peace in learning 
to truly be without hope, in deeply accepting one’s fundamental existential hopelessness. This 
argument is also central to traditions such as Buddhism (Hayes, 2002), which perhaps explains 
why Eastern cultures are thought to be more comfortable with a pessimistic outlook (Uchida & 
Ogihara, 2012). In any case, the value of strategic pessimism is more easily discerned: a 
pessimistic mind-set may prompt one to prepare for potential problems, thus lessening the 
likelihood of these actually eventuating. A veridical example of this is given by the astronaut 
Chris Hadfield (2013), who describes the training programme at NASA as involving endless 
simulations of ‘bad-news scenarios’ to provide practice for dealing with all conceivable mishaps. 
He argues that such ‘pessimistic’ repetitive contingency planning was highly valuable, enabling 
him to forge ‘the strongest possible armor to defend against fear: hard-won competence’ (p.54). 
Self-esteem and humility 
Our second dichotomy is self-esteem and humility (close, if not perfect, antonyms). Generally, 
high levels of self-esteem are more conducive to wellbeing than low levels: a prospective study 
by Trzesniewski et al. (2006) found that adolescents with low self-esteem were liable to greater 
criminality, worse job prospects, and poorer mental and physical health in adulthood. However, 
there are parallels between the pitfalls of optimism and high self-esteem (indeed, self-esteem 
might almost be regarded as an optimism of the self). As with optimism, the risks of self-esteem 
were recognised by some PP scholars from the outset; for instance, Seligman (1995, p.27) felt 
that widespread attempts by parents and teachers to boost self-esteem was ‘making this 
generation of children more vulnerable to depression,’ since children would inevitably suffer if 
and when their own positive self-appraisals were later punctured by the blunt realities of 
competitive life in adulthood. Moreover, inflated self-assessments can lead to people attempting 
tasks that exceed their capacities, leading potentially to failure; this can be particularly 
damaging if one’s self esteem is contingent on extrinsic validation and achievement of these 
goals (Crocker & Park, 2004). Further still, in combination with noxious qualities like 
narcissism, self-esteem can have a dark side, being linked to higher levels of aggression, 
particularly when inflated self-appraisals are threatened (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). 
There can even be health risks, since high self-esteem is linked to perceived invulnerability and 
consequent health-risk behaviours (Gerrard, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & Russell, 2000). 
 Conversely, there is value in humility. While this is not strictly an antonym of high self-
esteem, it is often treated as such (Rowatt, Ottenbreit, Nesselroade Jr, & Cunningham, 2002): 
etymologically, it derives from the Latin humilis (literally ‘on the ground’), and is frequently 
taken to mean having a low opinion of oneself, as revealed by the contemptuous derivate 
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‘humiliation’ (being reduced to lowliness). However, Rowatt et al. argue that it involves a 
‘genuine modesty’ that is of great value, characterised by ‘respectfulness, willingness to admit 
imperfections, and a lack of self-focus or self-serving biases’ (p.198). For a start, many virtuous 
prosocial acts stem from such self-abnegation (Worthington, 2007). However, the impact on the 
protagonist themselves may be even more profound. For instance, a central tenet of Buddhism 
is that an overweening sense of self (or ego), and a lack of due humility, is the root of suffering, 
generating noxious states like greed (seeking to reward the self) and hatred (for that which 
threatens the self). As such, the ‘forgetting of the self’ that characterises humility is a salve for 
these self-created poisons (Tangey, 2005, p.411). Going further, discussing the value of humility 
in the context of medical training, DasGupta (2008) suggests that it can enable one to become 
spiritually ‘transfigured,’ since it renders one receptive to qualities in the world (like beauty) 
that a pre-occupation with self might otherwise cause one to overlook. However, from a 
dialectical point of view, self-esteem and humility need not be antonyms; it is possible to find a 
Hegelian synthesis of the two (a positive yet humble sense of self), e.g., through self-acceptance 
(Wong, 1998). 
Freedom and restriction 
The value of freedom – and related concepts such as self-determination – is almost axiomatic 
within PP, regarded as essential to wellbeing (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Indeed, the torments that can 
occur if freedom is denied, such as in slavery, are undeniable. However, it has been suggested, 
notably by existentialist thinkers, that an excess of freedom, a life untrammelled by restrictions, 
can be troubling (Yalom, 1980). Dostoevsky (1880) argued that freedom from religious 
proscriptions would erode morality (‘everything is permitted’). Moreover, Kierkegaard (1834) 
felt that this ‘dizzying’ sense of unlimited possibilities could engender ontological ‘dread,’ since 
we must continually make choices that irrevocably shape our lives, and assume responsibility 
for the consequences; as Sartre (1952, p.399) put it, people are ‘condemned to be free.’ 
Schwartz (2000, p.79) offers a contemporary take on these insights, suggesting that ‘excessive’ 
freedom can be experienced ‘as a kind of tyranny.’ He critiques the ideology of rational-choice 
economic theory that forms the basis of our consumer-capitalist society, citing work which 
demonstrates that greater diversity of choice often leads to lower levels of subsequent 
satisfaction with the chosen item (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999), perhaps in part as a result of 
greater scope for regret over the unselected options. While such troubles may be a luxury 
afforded by affluence, it does corroborate the existentialists’ perceptive linking of freedom and 
anxiety.  
 Conversely, limiting one’s freedom can be beneficial to wellbeing; paradoxically, it may 
even be liberating. Returning again to Buddhism, it is argued that restricting choice can 
perversely create freedom. For example, the rigid routines of monastic life are designed to 
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alleviate the burden of the many inconsequential but incessant choices that dominate daily life 
(e.g., around what to eat or wear), thus freeing the mind to engage in the ‘non-conceptual and 
focused’ attention that is so valued by meditators (Wright, 2008, p.14). The creation of routines 
– rigid patterns of behaviour that are adhered to regardless of the whims of passing moods – is 
valuable in other domains of life too, from education to physical health. For instance, regular 
exercise depends upon a person committing to a pattern of activity and keeping to this routine, 
even (or perhaps especially) in the face of occasional disinclination (Aarts, Paulussen, & 
Schaalma, 1997). As shown so revealing by Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez (1989), wellbeing 
depends on being able to resist fleeting inclinations, on creating strategies to help override 
short-sighted desires. Only thus can one forgo more immediate satisfactions, and so pursue 
longer-term goals – from maintaining one’s health to studying for qualifications – that are 
ultimately more beneficial. However, in considering freedom, it is again possible to achieve a 
higher Hegelian synthesis that brings together freedom and restriction. We can appreciate this 
by considering Frankl’s (1963) distinction between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’; the latter 
refers to a vital freedom of attitude, in which one has the courage to assert and pursue one’s 
core values. Crucially, ‘freedom to’ can still exist under the most restrictive conditions, even – in 
Frankl’s own tragic case – in wartime concentration camps. The above example of a Buddhist 
monastic is also illustrative in this regard (albeit their restrictive conditions are self-imposed).   
Forgiveness and anger 
Turning now to prosocial qualities, an exemplar of which is forgiveness, are these not ‘non-zero-
sum’ goods, beneficial to both giver and recipient? Forgiveness is indeed generally considered 
beneficial to the wellbeing of the forgiver (and the forgivee). For instance, forgiveness-based 
therapies have been successfully used to treat posttraumatic stress disorder following spousal 
abuse (Reed & Enright, 2006). However, in certain contexts, forgiveness may be harmful, 
particularly if it means a person acquiesces to an invidious situation that they might otherwise 
be compelled to resist or change. This point has been made by McNulty and Fincham (2011) – 
who highlight the need for a contextual approach to PP – through a summary of longitudinal 
studies on abusive relationships. These surveys suggest that people who make benevolent 
external attributions for their partner’s abuse (explaining it away as a result of situational 
factors, like stress), and/or who are more forgiving of such transgressions, are at greater risk of 
on-going abuse. Needless to say, such studies are not engaging in victim-blaming, but are trying 
to help injured parties hold their aggressors to account; the real issue is of course is the 
injurious actions of their abuser. Nevertheless, such studies do highlight the fact that the value 
of prosocial qualities can often depend on context. 
 Conversely, while anger is often presented as a destructive emotion (Beck, 1999), there 
are times when this might not only be a more appropriate response to wrongdoing than 
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forgiveness, but one which may ultimately serve to better promote wellbeing in the long run. 
Leading this re-evaluation of anger is Tavris (1989), who argues that it is fundamentally a moral 
emotion, a response to an ethical/moral breach. Of course, this does not imply that all acts of 
anger are justified or proportionate. As Aristotle (350BCE) put it, it takes great skill to ‘be angry 
with the right person and to the right degree and at the right time and for the right purpose, and 
in the right way.’ Nor does it mean that anger is always virtuous; it can be selfish and/or 
antisocial (Haidt, 2003). Nevertheless, as Haidt acknowledges, ‘the motivation to redress 
injustices can also be felt strongly in third-party situations, in which the self has no stake’ 
(p.856). Thus, one can, and arguably should, feel outrage at iniquities such as oppression, and so 
‘demand retaliatory or compensatory action’ on behalf of the victims. Indeed, one could argue 
that the great progressive movements of recent history, from civil rights to feminism, have been 
propelled by a ‘righteous anger’ that the world should and can be better than it is (Siegel, 2009). 
Crucially, this does not mean fighting oppression through hate; as great leaders such as His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama have shown, it is possible to combat oppression while being guided by 
compassion and love, even for one’s persecutors. As expressed by Dr Martin Luther King (2007, 
p.345) in 1958, ‘As you press on for justice, be sure to move with dignity and discipline, using 
only the weapon of love. Let no man pull you so low as to make you hate him.’  
Happiness and sadness 
For our final dichotomy, we turn to arguably the ultimate concern of PP, happiness itself. The 
pursuit of this ephemeral goal has been central to the field since its inception, and indeed has 
been valorised throughout human history, from Aristotle’s (350BCE) Nichomachean Ethics to 
the American constitution. However, without denying the value of this goal, we can identify 
various issues here, including problems relating to both seeking and finding happiness. In terms 
of seeking it, one issue is that one may be errant in one’s pursuit, and chase the ‘wrong’ (i.e., 
relatively unfulfilling) forms of it. Central to PP is the distinction between hedonic ‘subjective’ 
wellbeing (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999) and eudaimonic ‘psychological’ wellbeing (Ryff, 
1989), even if this binary division has been critiqued in recent years (e.g., Kashdan, Biswas-
Diener, & King, 2008). Often implicit within this distinction is a qualitative value judgment, 
where eudamonic wellbeing is seen as deeper, more fulfilling, or in some inchoate way as 
simply better than hedonic varieties. Such judgments can be dated back at least as far as 
Aristotle who valorised eudaimonic happiness as an ‘activity of the soul that expresses virtue,’ 
while condemning mere hedonic pleasure as a ‘life suitable to beasts’ (cited in McMahon, 2006). 
From this perspective, seeking hedonic happiness could be disadvantageous if it hindered one 
from seeking qualitatively richer states of wellbeing. 
However, the notion of seeking wellbeing can itself be critiqued, as it has been observed 
in many quarters that the act of pursing happiness renders it ever more distant. As theorists 
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such as Frankl (1963) have recognised, happiness may possibly never successfully be directly 
sought; rather, it tends to arise only as an oblique, mysterious by-product of engaging in other 
pursuits, such as a search for meaning. To quote Mill (1873, p.100), ‘those only are happy who 
have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness.’ This same insight is 
found in Buddhism, where the desire for happiness is seen as the root of unhappiness: the very 
act of resisting the present and wishing for a better situation is what creates the dissatisfaction 
one hopes to alleviate. This wisdom has found its contemporary expression in Carver and 
Scheier’s (1990) cybernetic self-regulation theory, in which dysphoria results from discrepancy 
between expectations and reality; yearning for happiness serves to widen this discrepancy, thus 
increasing dissatisfaction (a theory corroborated by empirical studies; e.g., Mauss, Tamir, 
Anderson, & Savino, 2011). Such yearning may be exacerbated by cultural pressures that turn 
happiness into something approaching a social norm; indeed critical theorists have accused PP 
of perpetuating this very process, contributing to a ‘tyranny of positive thinking’ (Held, 2002). 
The charge is that if happiness becomes expected, even obligatory, this can engender a climate 
of implicit blame and stigmatisation towards those who fail to achieve this goal, with 
unhappiness seen almost as a moral failure (Ahmed, 2007; Ehrenreich, 2009).  
 Beyond seeking happiness, our second issue here concerns, perversely, the unforeseen 
pitfalls of being happy (or at least believing that one is). The risks of attaining a modest amount 
of satisfaction is that it may lull one into thinking that life is as good as it could be. There is, for 
instance, a danger of becoming tranquilised and acquiescent to social contexts that ultimately 
undermine wellbeing through iniquities such as societal inequality. In this way, one may be 
beguiled by modest satisfactions into entering what Marxist theorists call ‘false consciousness,’ 
i.e., a state of mind that prevents us from acting in our own interests (Jost, 1995). For instance, 
Marx’s (1844) critique of religion was not that it was without value, but rather that its comforts 
(e.g., belief in the afterlife) lulled people into inaction; he thus urged people to relinquish these 
comforts in order to rise up against the oppressive social conditions that force people to need 
such comforts, and find justice and happiness here on earth: ‘The abolition of religion as the 
illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness’ (p.244). Perhaps one needs 
to feel discomfort in order to be compelled to create a better life – one that would ultimately be 
more conducive to wellbeing. Indeed, with so many people suffering worldwide through myriad 
torments, from poverty to war, should we even want to be happy? Some theorists have argued 
that we may actually be closer to the spirit of wanting humanity to flourish if we are angry, 
protesting against the state of the world. As Ahmed (2010, p.223) puts it, ‘revolutionary politics’ 
– i.e., movements to change the world for the better, among which one might arguably include 
PP – must ‘work hard to stay proximate to unhappiness.’  
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 However, we must not suggest that dysphoria is only acceptable if it is useful. And it is 
here that we turn to sadness. Admittedly, people have argued that sadness has its merits, for 
example as an aesthetic emotion (Thoolen, Ridder, Bensing, Gorter, & Rutten, 2009), or a sign of 
one’s sensitivity (Christiansen, Oettingen, Dahme, & Klinger, 2010). For instance, sadness may 
arise as a compassionate response to the ubiquity of suffering in the world, a sorrow which 
moreover may fuel a personal sense of meaning and mission (as Shenk (2006) identified in 
relation to Abraham Lincoln, for instance). However, the more important point is that sadness 
may be a profoundly true emotion, a genuine response to a tragic situation. For instance, for 
bereaved parents, intense experiences of grief are an expression of love, and indeed a ‘way to 
maintain a connection to a beloved deceased child’ (Thieleman & Cacciatore, 2014, p.6). As we 
asked above, in such a baleful situation, would one even want to feel differently? Would not 
happiness, or any such ‘positive’ state of mind, be thoroughly inappropriate? Thus, as Woolfolk 
(2002, p.23) recognised, while flourishing no doubt involves elevating emotions such joy, when 
appropriate, it ought to also encompass the sensitivity to be ‘touched or moved by the world… 
inextricably intertwined with a capacity to experience the sadness and pathos that emanates 
from the transitory nature of things.’ However, there is currently a danger of PP – in its first 
wave forms – contributing to a cultural discourse in which ‘negative’ states like sadness are 
viewed, not as appropriate reactions to a troubling world, but as dysfunctions to be alleviated. 
Of course, therapeutic help should be given to people who want assistance to deal with negative 
states of mind. However, we enter troubling territory once we begin to pathologise these 
dimensions of human existence. As Horowitz and Wakeﬁeld (2007, p.225) put it, sadness is ‘an 
inherent part of the human condition, not a mental disorder.’  
Unfortunately though, we do see a creeping medicalization of existence, where ordinary 
aspects of being human are treated as diseases to be medicated away (Szasz, 1960). This can be 
troubling on multiple levels. It can alienate sufferers themselves, making them feel estranged 
from their suffering, and from humanity, as if they are flawed or broken. There can be more 
severe consequences too, such as the involuntary deprivation of freedom in psychiatric care 
(Matthews, 2000). As such, PP must be wary of colluding in discourses that condemn and even 
pathologise negative experiences like sadness. Of course, it is to be welcomed that PP provides 
interventions that enable people, if they wish, to alleviate their distress and generate wellbeing. 
However, it is vital that PP does not imply that dysphoric states are inherently wrong. For one 
thing, this judgement may well compound such distress, leading sufferers to feel bad about 
feeling bad; in Buddhism, this is known as the ‘two arrows’ (Bhikkhu, 2013): one’s initial 
distress (the first arrow) is wounding enough, but berating oneself over feeling distressed is a 
second arrow that compounds the suffering. Moreover, such states may bear important 
messages, in which one may find value: they may show us how much we care about someone or 
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something, be a source of inspiration, or a font of meaning and even beauty. We shall see these 
ideas borne out in the next section, which focuses on the phenomenon of posttraumatic growth. 
However, we must also acknowledge that states of suffering may sometimes not bear any such 
positive messages or herald future beneficial changes, but may simply be distressing; but it is 
important for that to be ok too, as simply another dimension of human experience that we allow 
ourselves to feel.  
Posttraumatic growth 
The five dichotomous case studies above have highlighted the dialectical ‘principle of appraisal,’ 
i.e., the difficulty in determining whether particular phenomena are positive or negative, since 
such a determination inextricably depends on context. In these final two sections, we consider a 
related problem, the ‘principle of co-valence,’ which refers to the idea that many aspects of 
functioning and flourishing involve a complex balance of positive and negative elements. To 
illustrate this point, in this section we consider one such complex process that has attracted 
much interest within PP, namely posttraumatic growth (PTG). Prior to the identification of PTG, 
the distress burden presented by trauma had become increasingly acknowledged in psychology 
and medicine; for instance, the notion of posttraumatic stress disorder was introduced into the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM-III) by the American Psychiatric 
Association (1980) in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. However, soon after, scholars began to 
recognise that adverse traumatic events did not impact people equally; for instance, O'Leary and 
Ickovics (1994) identified four possible responses to adversity: succumbing (drastically 
impaired functioning); survival with impairment; resilience (returning to pre-adversity baseline 
levels of functioning); and thriving (people recovering to experience even higher levels of 
functioning than pre-adversity). Reflecting this last category, Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) 
proposed the concept of PTG, which they defined as ‘positive change that occurs as a result of 
the struggle with highly challenging life crises’ (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004, p.1). Since then, a 
wealth of studies have corroborated the concept, with studies invariably finding that ‘a majority’ 
(percentages vary) of people suffering trauma experience some degree of PTG, with the trauma 
in question ranging from illness like cancer (e.g., Koutrouli, Anagnostopoulos, & Potamianos, 
2012) to natural disasters such as cyclones (Pooley, Cohen, O’Connor, & Taylor, 2013). 
 The crucial point about PTG, from our SWPP perspective here, is that it is thoroughly 
dialectical, in a number of ways. At the most basic level, it is dialectical because positive changes 
are reported as arising out of a negative experience, or as Calhoun and Tedeschi (2013, p.6) put 
it, are ‘set in motion by the encounter with difficult life situations.’ More specifically, PTG is 
associated with a number of positive changes – although it is by no means inevitable that a 
person will experience all, or indeed any, of these – including: increased personal strength (e.g., 
more creative, mature), enhanced relationships (closer and more appreciative), altered life 
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philosophy (e.g., increased existential awareness and meaning-making, including finding 
meaning in the trauma), changed priorities (e.g., less focus on material goals, and greater 
appreciation of life), and enhanced spirituality. However, PTG is further dialectical in that it is an 
on-going process in which positive and negative are continually intertwined. It is not just a case 
of good following bad; studies indicate that PTG tends to co-evolve in conjunction with on-going 
distress (Dekel, Ein-Dor, & Solomon, 2012).  
Indeed, this co-evolution substantiates the more general point that well- and ill-being 
can co-exist, as Bassi et al. (2014) report in relation to persons with multiple sclerosis. Indeed, 
this notion of the co-presence of ill-being and wellbeing applies equally to people who have 
suffered trauma but who may not experience PTG. For these people, even if there is no ‘growth’ 
per se, there is still the task and the possibility of finding some degree of wellbeing after the 
event, even if this just means managing to survive and living to see another day, and perhaps 
enjoying the occasional moments of happiness and relief from their burdens. Moreover, in a 
broader sense, the imperative of attempting to flourish amidst the hardships of life extends 
beyond the notion of PTG. While only a subset of the population may encounter severe trauma – 
and only a certain percentage of these undergo PTG – arguably all people experience some 
degree of suffering in their lives. Indeed, schools of thought such as Buddhism suggest that 
suffering is a ubiquitous and universal aspect of life, at least until people attain certain peaks of 
psychospiritual development (Hayes, 2002). As such, for the vast majority of humanity, a key 
existential challenge is to find some sense of wellbeing in spite of the inevitable challenges that 
life throws, some precious light amidst the gloom. 
Moreover, in PTG, distress and growth may not simply be co-present, but in some ways 
co-dependent. Consider the possibility of altered life philosophies and priorities: renewed 
appreciation of life is often founded upon the existentially challenging recognition of the 
fragility and fleetingness of life. It has even been argued that many character strengths cannot 
be cultivated – or at least only to a limited extent – without a person experiencing suffering and 
hardship (Wong, 1995). As such, PTG, and flourishing more generally, is not only co-valenced, 
but demonstrates the ‘principle of complementarity,’ i.e., that wellbeing depends upon a 
complex balance and harmonisation of positive and negative. Of course, one does not need to 
suffer trauma to be able to appreciate this point; it is also true of arguably the most elevated of 
human experiences – love. 
Love 
We finish this paper by considering the inherently dialectical nature of love. As with PTG, we 
can see that this is thoroughly co-valenced, and is thus a further demonstration of the principle 
of complementarity. Before examining its dialectics, it is worth noting that there are many ways 
of looking at love, a term which encompasses a multitude of emotional relationships. Drawing 
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on distinctions elucidated by thinkers at least as far back as classical Greece, Lee (1973) 
differentiated between six different ‘types’ of love: eros (romantic, passionate), ludus (flirtatious, 
playful), storge (filial, fraternal), pragma (rational, sensible), mania (possessive, dependent), 
and agape (unconditional, selfless). While such differentiations mean one should be wary of 
generalising about love, arguably most, if not all, of these types – possibly excepting agape – can 
be recognised as co-valenced, involving a dialectical blend of light and dark elements. There are 
many ways of viewing this dialectic, but all are essentially variations on the idea, expressed so 
eloquently by C.S. Lewis (1971) in The Four Loves that, ‘To love at all is to be vulnerable. Love 
anything and your heart will be wrung and possibly broken.’ Love can be troubled by the 
vicissitudes of fate in all manner of ways, from enforced partings to the erosion of feelings over 
time. Even in love, one can be threatened by the fear of its loss, giving rise to complications in 
one’s expressions of love, from anxiety to jealousy to anger. Indeed, in their book The Dark Side 
of Close Relationships, Spitzberg and Cupach (1998, p.xiii) claim that ‘love and hate are indeed 
impossible to disentangle.’ While this provocative suggestion may not apply to all instances of 
love – storge, pragma and agape all stand out as probable exceptions – it remains that love 
invariably and inevitably encompasses a spectrum of negative feelings that can be troubling to 
varying degrees.  
However – and this is where the second wave appreciation of dialectics comes to the 
fore – the vulnerability and potential dysphoria that are arguably inherent in love are not 
aberrations, but the very condition of it. Such vulnerability is inseparable from love, they are 
two sides of the same coin; it is the condition one must enter into in order to be in love. This is 
because love requires one to place one’s fate in the hands of an ‘Other,’ whose actions cannot be 
controlled, and whose reciprocal love cannot be willed. And, as Levinas (1987, p.88) puts it, it is 
this ‘insurmountable duality of beings’ that creates ‘the pathos of love’.’ Love is thus 
fundamentally dialectical; a transcendent blend of joy and terror, safety and fear. It is for this 
reason that we have included love as an example of the ‘principle of co-valence’ rather than the 
‘principle of appraisal.’ It would be possible, as per the latter principle, to suggest that whether 
love is experienced as positive or negative depends upon the context (e.g., reciprocated versus 
unrequited versions respectively). However, we have included it here in the context of 
discussing co-valence since the positive and negative aspects of love are arguably co-creating. 
For instance, the stronger and more intense one’s love for a person, the greater the peril that 
one opens oneself up to (e.g., the heartbreak one would suffer if the relationship ended against 
one’s will). As Bauman (2013, p.6) memorably phrases it, ‘to love means opening up to that 
most sublime of all human conditions, one in which fear blends with joy into an alloy that no 
longer allows its ingredients to separate.’ This perspective on love arguably aligns with Delle 
Fave et al.’s (2011) notion of harmonization – definable as ‘balancing opposite elements into a 
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whole’ (p.199) – which was rated as the most important psychological component of happiness 
by participants themselves. As such, it could be argued that people intuitively understand and 
appreciate this point that many of our most valued and important experiences involve just this 
kind of dialectical balance, and nowhere more so than in the case of love. 
Conclusion 
This paper has provided a summary of SWPP – which, following Wong (2011), could equally be 
referred to as PP 2.0 – which is above all characterised by appreciation of the dialectical nature 
of wellbeing (in conjunction with other subsidiary elements, such as a deep understanding of 
context). It was suggested that this dialectical appreciation centres on three key components: 
the principle of appraisal (the difficulty of categorising phenomena as either positive or 
negative), the principle of co-valence (the notion that many experiences involve a blend of 
positive and negative elements), and the principle of complementarity (the idea that wellbeing 
and flourishing depend upon a complex balance and harmonization of light and dark aspects of 
life). The principle of appraisal was demonstrated through five case studies of conceptual 
dichotomies, which revealed that an appraisal of the respective value of each of the polarities 
was dependent upon context. The principle of co-valence was shown through two case studies 
of complex processes – posttraumatic growth and love – which, while both being indicative of 
flourishing, involve a balance of positive and negative experiences. Together, both issues – of 
appraisal and co-valence – substantiate the broader issue of complementarity, which holds that 
flourishing depends on the delicate dialectic interaction of light and dark aspects of living. These 
considerations show the way in which PP is evolving and maturing as a discipline, and point the 
way ahead to future scholarship on the nature of wellbeing. 
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